Reducing the size of Winnipeg's City Council : process, myths, realities and alternatives by Mathur, Brijesh
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reducing the Size of Winnipeg’s City Council: 
Process, Myths, Realities and Alternatives 
 
 
_________________ 
 
by Brijesh Mathur 
1991 
 
__________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
The Institute of Urban Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FOR INFORMATION:  
 
The Institute of Urban Studies  
The University of Winnipeg 
599 Portage Avenue, Winnipeg  
phone: 204.982.1140  
fax: 204.943.4695  
general email: ius@uwinnipeg.ca  
 
Mailing Address:  
The Institute of Urban Studies  
The University of Winnipeg 
515 Portage Avenue  
Winnipeg, Manitoba, R3B 2E9  
 
 
REDUCING THE SIZE OF WINNIPEG’S CITY COUNCIL: PROCESS, MYTHS, REALITIES AND 
ALTERNATIVES 
Published 1991 by the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg 
© THE INSTITUTE OF URBAN STUDIES 
 
Note: The cover page and this information page are new replacements, 2015.  
 
 
The Institute of Urban Studies is an independent research arm of the University of Winnipeg. Since 
1969, the IUS has been both an academic and an applied research centre, committed to examining 
urban development issues in a broad, non-partisan manner. The Institute examines inner city, 
environmental, Aboriginal and community development issues. In addition to its ongoing 
involvement in research, IUS brings in visiting scholars, hosts workshops, seminars and conferences, 
and acts in partnership with other organizations in the community to effect positive change. 
I 
~I 
i! 
I 
! i 
'I 
li 
I 
' I i. 
'' 
i! 
i i 
i: 
REDUCING THE SIZE OF WINNIPEG'S CITY COUNCIL: 
PROCESS, MYTHS, REALITIES AND ALTERNATIVES 
Brijesh Mathur 
Institute of Urban Studies 
1991 
i I 
i 
. I 
'1 
' 
i I 
I: 
TABLE OF CON1ENTS 
1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT DEBA1E . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
1.1 REDUCTIONS 1N SIZE OF COUNCIL SJNCE 1960 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
1.2 TilE CURRENT DEBA'IE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
2.0 PURPOSE AND CON1ENT OF THIS PAPER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 
3.0 THE PROCESS FOR DELINEATING WARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
3.1 TilE ESTABLISHED PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
3.2 TilE IMMEDIA'IE PRECEDENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
3.3 TilE CURRENT PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
3.4 CREDIDILITY AND lEGITIMACY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
4.0 MY1HS AND REALITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
4.1 MYTH #1 - REDUCJNG COUNCIL SIZE WILL lEAD TO COST 
REDUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
4.2 MYTH #2 - REDUCJNG COUNCIL SIZE WILL BRJNG TilE 
CITY COUNCIL 1N LINE WITH OTIIER Cfi'IES . . . . 7 
4.3 MYTH #3 - DECREASJNG COUNCIL SIZE WILL lEAD TO 
GREA'IER ACCOUNTABILITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
4.4 MYTH #4 - A SMALLER CITY COUNCIL WILL IMPROVE 
DECISION-MAKIN"G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
4.5 MYTH #5 - REDUCED CITY COUNCIL AND CONSTITUTING 
PIE SHAPED WARDS WILL REDUCE PAROCHIALISM . . . . . . . 10 
5.0 PIE-SHAPED WARDS: A RECIPE FOR SUBURBAN BIAS, 
INNER CITY NEGLECT AND THE MARGINALIZING OF 
COMMUNITIES OF IN1EREST . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
5.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
5.2 TilE MAP SETS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 
5.3 IDENTIFYING CITY-WIDE JN'IERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
5.4 EFFECTS OF PIE-SHAPED WARDS ON CITY-WIDE 
JN'IERESTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 
5.5 FJNANCIAL IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
i 
i i 
! i 
i i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued) 
6.0 AL1ERNATIVES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
7.0 CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
APPENDIX A - MAP SETS 
CHARACTERISTICS OF WINNIPEG WARDS, 
COMMUNITY COMMITTEE AREAS AND 
HYPOTHETICAL PIE-SHAPED WARDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
i I 
! i 
'I 
I I 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This publication is the result of the Institute's desire to contribute to the current 
debate in Winnipeg over the size of Winnipeg's City Council. The assistance of three 
student researchers of the University Winnipeg in collecting the information on which this 
paper is based is gratefully acknowledged. Herbert Koehl collected much of the data and 
prepared the maps. Christian Douchant collected data and prepared tables. Christian 
Cassidy's paper, "Bigger Wards-Bigger Councils? A Case Against Reduction of Winnipeg 
City Council," prepared for my class, provided a ready reference on the issues raised in the 
current debate on the size of Council. Professor Christopher Leo provided valuable 
suggestions of substance. 
Brijesh Mathur 
Acting Director 
! : 
1.0 INTRODUCTION TO THE CURRENT DEBATE 
1.1 REDUCTIONS IN SIZE OF COUNCIL SINCE 1960 
The size of Winnipeg's City Council has been a recurrent issue for many years. In 
1960, there were 102 elected officials in the municipalities which then constituted 
Metropolitan Winnipeg. Metropolitan Council consisted of 10 members directly elected 
from special pie-shaped districts which included both inner city and suburban areas. The 
rationale for such a system was that while Councillors in the constituent municipalities would 
represent the interests of their respective wards, the Metropolitan Councillors would bring 
a city-wide view to govern Winnipeg. It was not a question of whether ward or city-wide 
interests should be represented, but rather that both interests were important for good local 
government. However, within such a system, there was considerable tension between the 
metropolitan and municipal government, and, in 1972, metropolitan government, was 
replaced by the amalgamation of the constituent municipalities into Winnipeg's Unicity. 
Emphasis was placed upon the representative role of local governments, and upon citizen 
access and participation. A large City Council consisting of 50 members elected from 
separate wards was constituted. 
In addition, the Unicity legislation established 13 Community Committees, each 
covering a number of wards and consisting of the Councillors from these wards. The 
Community Committees were intended as the means for achieving greater participation and 
decentralization of certain functions. To advise and assist each Committee, the legislation 
provided for the establishment of a Residents Advisory Group (RAG). Despite the 
emphasis upon participation, the goals of participation were not realized, and certain 
problems of accountability and leadership developed in the day-to-day functioning of 
Council. In 1977, several of amendments were made to the Unicity structure. However, 
these amendments did not address the problems that had surfaced. Among the amendments 
was one which reduced the size of Council from 50 to 29, and of the Community 
Committees to 6 from 13. Certain discretionary powers of the Committees were also 
abolished. 
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A review of the City of Winnipeg Act in 1986 examined, among other issues, the 
question of the size of City Council, and recommended that the number of wards be reduced 
to 24, but that the number of Community Committees remain the same (6). That 
recommendation was not implemented. It is interesting to note that the number of wards 
has been reduced from 102 in 1960 to 29 in 1991, a reduction of nearly 300%. However the 
problems of governance have not been solved. In 1988, the newly elected Progressive 
Conservative minority government of Manitoba drafted legislation to amend the City of 
Winnipeg Act to reduce the size of City Council from 29 to 23 members. That amendment 
was defeated in the Legislature. 
1.2 THE CURRENT DEBA1E 
The current debate (1991) over the size of City Council has surfaced as a result of an 
announcement made by the leaders of the Progressive Conservative and Liberal parties 
during the 1990 Manitoba election, to reduce the size of City Council in the interests of 
greater efficiency and economy. The leader of the Progressive Conservative Party 
announced during the campaign that if elected, he would reduce the size of Winnipeg's City 
Council to a number between 12 and 15, and expressed his preference for pie-shaped wards 
which include both inner-city and suburban areas. Upon forming the government, the 
Progressive Conservatives appointed "The Winnipeg Wards Review Committee" to 
recommend an appropriate number of Councillors between 12 and 15; the future of the 
Community Committees; and the basis for electing councillors. The process has been widely 
criticized for deviating from established practices governing the delineation of wards. There 
is also a belief among many that a further reduction in the size of City Council will not result 
in improving the functioning of the city's government. Moreover, it is also argued that pie-
shaped wards will disenfranchise certain groups, particularly those in the inner city. 
2.0 PURPOSE AND CONTENT OF THIS PAPER 
One objective of this paper is to examine the legitimacy of the current process for 
undertaking a review of Winnipeg's wards. Another is to examine the popular beliefs which 
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have led to the advocacy of reducing the size of Winnipeg's City Council. A third objective 
is empirically to examine the consequences on representation of constituting pie-shaped 
wards in Winnipeg. Following from such an examination, alternatives to reducing the size 
of City Council for achieving responsible government in Winnipeg are suggested. 
The main purpose in producing this paper was to present it to the Winnipeg Wards 
Review Committee and to others who may have an interest in the debate. The paper was 
prepared over a period of a few days. In the interests of increasing its readability, the 
author has purposely kept away from the normal scholarly practice of footnoting and 
referencing throughout the body of the paper. Instead, a bibliography has been appended 
for those who may wish to explore the issues further. 
3.0 THE PROCESS FOR DELINEATING WARDS 
3.1 THE ESTABLISHED PROCESS 
Sections 5 (2) and 20 ( 4) of the City of Winnipeg Act (1971) prescribe the procedures 
with respect to the delineation of ward boundaries in Winnipeg. These sections of the Act 
provide for the establishment of The Winnipeg Wards Boundaries Commission constituted 
of the Chief Justice of the Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench, the President of the 
University of Winnipeg and the Returning Officer of the City of Winnipeg. Such a 
commission met in 1988, and is required to meet every ninth year thereafter, or whenever 
recalled to review ward boundaries. Unless recalled, it is next scheduled to convene in 1997. 
Since the review of boundaries is a politically sensitive matter, the intent in setting out 
the composition of the Commission in legislation is to avoid the perception of irregular 
practices. Moreover, the entrustment of the responsibility to persons who are viewed as 
objective and impartial, and who possess a certain stature in the community reinforces the 
credibility of the Commission and its recommendations. 
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3.2 THE IMMEDIATE PRECEDENT 
After the Commission was convened in 1988, it was advised by the Minister of Urban 
Affairs of the minority government that his government intended to seek the amendment 
of the City of Winnipeg Act to reduce the size of City Council from 29 to 23 members. The 
Minister urged the Commission to consider such an intent in preparing its recommendations. 
The Commission prepared two proposals, one for 23 wards, and the other for 29 wards and 
presented these at public hearings. However, before the hearings could be completed, the 
Government introduced the amendment in the Legislature. As stated earlier, that 
amendment was defeated. Following the public hearings, the Commission came to its own 
conclusion that in order to ensure community integrity and effective governance, the number 
of wards should remain unchanged at 29. 
3.3 THE CURRENT PROCESS 
Upon re-election after a mid-term election, during which the reduction of the size of 
City Council was announced, the Minister of Urban Affairs, ignoring the established 
legislative process for the delineation of wards, appointed "The Winnipeg Wards Review 
Committee" to report with recommendations on: 
the appropriate number of Councillors between 12 and 15; 
whether Community Committees should continue to exist; 
whether to continue to have one Councillor elected from each ward, or to have a new 
ward system with more than one Councillor representing a ward; 
• whether to have pie-shaped wards or some other configuration, and 
to submit a report with recommendations on the boundaries and names of each ward 
in the City of Winnipeg. 
3.4 CREDIBILITY AND lEGITIMACY 
Apart from questions of legality, the creditbility and impartiality of the Committee 
appointed by the Minister has been questioned in the community for the following reasons: 
• No White Paper was prepared by the government setting out its reasons for reducing 
the size of Council, a decision which the government has made without any public 
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discussion and a decision which is a given for the Committee. 
• The Committee was not constituted of members prescribed in the City of Winnipeg 
Act. Instead, the Committee was constituted of three members, two of whom are 
known supporters of the party in power (one is a defeated candidate, the other a 
spouse of a candidate in the provincial election). 
• Even before appointing the Committee to advise the government on the nature of 
wards, the Premier of the Province and the Minister of Urban Affairs had publicly 
declared their preference for pie-shaped wards. 
Although the government won a slim majority in Manitoba, it won only 13 of the 31 
ridings in Winnipeg. All of these were in suburban areas of the city. Thus, the 
government cannot claim that it has the support of Winnipeggers for its election 
announcement on size of Council, and particularly the dismantling of inner-city wards. 
The above discussion prompts the conclusion that the process has little moral or 
political legitimacy, even though it may well be legal and can probably be justified on 
obscure legalistic and bureaucratic grounds. At a time when public confidence in the 
uprightness and honesty of elected governments in Canada is at an all-time low, the adoption 
of such a process would appear to be particularly insidious. However, the persistence with 
which the present government has pursued this issue suggests that it must believe that the 
ends which it hopes to achieve are so good that the means may be justified. No doubt, such 
a faith would rest upon some beliefs or myths related to its ends. The section which follows 
examines those myths. 
4.0 MY1HS AND REALITIES 
A review of reports and articles in the print media of Winnipeg revealed five main 
arguments advanced by proponents of reducing the size of Council. Of these, four 
arguments are advanced primarily in favour of reduced Council size, while a fifth combines 
the argument for a smaller Council, with that for pie-shaped wards: 
1. That a reduction in the size of City Council will save taxpayers' money in annual 
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2. 
3. 
4. 
expenses of Council; 
That a reduction in size will bring Winnipeg's City Council in line with other Canadian 
cities of comparable size; 
That a reduction in size will make Council and civic administration more accountable; 
That a reduction in the size of Council will result in more speedy, coherent and 
consistent decision-making; and 
5. That a reduction in size, in conjunction with pie-shaped wards, will reduce the so-called 
"parochialism" in decision-making which is said to characterize Council decisions. 
Any student of Canadian local government will be able to discern a pattern in the 
above arguments which ties them to persistent conventional Tory reform ideology which 
emerged at the turn of the century. That ideology is based on notions of getting politics out 
of municipal government and providing greater control over civic affairs to the business 
community, along with marginalizing labour interests. However, the purpose in raising this 
point is not to dwell on the finer points of local government literature, but to point out that 
the notion is rooted in ideology. 
4.1 MYfH #1 -REDUCING COUNCIL SIZE WilL LEAD TO COST REDUCTION 
On the surface, the notion of cost reduction is one that is most easily sold to the 
unaware as a justification to reduce the size of City Council. The simple arithmetic of 12 
or 15 Councillors in place of 29 suggests that a penny or two off the tax bill might be saved. 
To some, Councillors, or politicians, for that matter, are not worth a penny anyway. 
However, when one considers that the issue of reducing the size of Council is closely tied 
to turning part-time Councillors into full-time, elected bureaucrats with doubled salaries, as 
well as offices, staff, expense accounts and the perks which would soon begin to pile up-the 
cost would not in fact be reduced, but more pennies would begin to flow out of the 
taxpayers pockets. Half the number of Councillors, would soon be worth at least twice as 
much. The real irony would be that most Councillors (by their own accounts) now serve the 
taxpayers for at least 40 hours per week at half salary. 
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Expenses of Councillors, however, would not be the only additional cost to the 
taxpayer. Because Councillors would then serve twice as many constituents, their workload 
would increase beyond reasonable hours unless they started to cut back on the time which 
they now spend serving their constituents. Their workload at City Hall would certainly not 
decrease, because there would be fewer of them to sit on Committees and to assume other 
responsibilities as full-time servants of the public who must make bureaucrats more 
accountable. 
The notion that a reduction in the size of City Council will lead to savings for the 
taxpayers does not bear scrutiny. 
4.2 MYTH #2- REDUCING COUNCIL SIZE WILL BRING THE CITY COUNCIL IN 
LINE WITH OTHER CITIES 
The size of City Council is closely tied to the ecological structure of the city and to the 
historical evolution of its government. In that sense, Winnipeg, with its cultural, ethnic, and 
socio-economic diversity and institutional evolution, is unique. Even a cursory review of 
Winnipeg's socio-economic conditions sets it apart from other Canadian cities. The social, 
economic and physical issues that Winnipeg's City Council has to manage, are more 
complex, diverse and intractable than those faced by Calgary and Edmonton. They require 
a diversity of views, which, in a democratic society, only the representation of diverse 
interests can bring. It is absurd to place Winnipeg's evolution and problems on a par with 
those of Calgary and Edmonton, the two cities of comparable size often cited as having 
fewer Councillors than Winnipeg. Those cities have a different structure of local 
government, and their ecological structure and institutional history are different. 
Within Manitoba, while Winnipeg's Councillors represent roughly 20,000 voters, 
Brandon's Councillors represent 4,000 and Portage La Prarie's only 1,200. Moreover, 31 
MLAs are elected from Winnipeg. If such a high intensity of representation is necessary in 
other urban areas and at the provincial level, then surely the 29 representatives on 
Winnipeg's Council, which is supposed to be closest to the people, are not too many. To 
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suggest otherwise is to make nonsense of the commonly held ideal that local government is 
closest to the people, and to use a double standard when considering the size of Winnipeg's 
Council, on the one hand, and representation of other jurisdictions and levels of government, 
on the other. 
4.3 MYTH #3 - DECREASING COUNCIL SIZE WilL LEAD TO GREATER 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
There is a belief among proponents of Council reduction that the lack of accountability 
of Councillors arises out of the fact that because there is a large number of them, it is 
difficult for the public to monitor their actions in Council. On this basis, it is argued, that 
it will be easier to keep track of fewer Councillors. This notion is too simplistic and almost 
impossible to confirm empirically without extensive surveys of the cognitive and mental 
retention capacity of voters' minds under controlled conditions. A more definitive approach 
to accountability of Council would be to open up the decision-making processes of Council, 
and to increase the participation of the public in municipal decision-making. 
Moreover, the problems of accountability in Winnipeg's city government, as in any large 
or complex organization, arises out of the lack of clarity in political and administrative roles. 
Councillors cannot be held responsible for their actions in the present set up because it is 
impossible to identify their role in making particular decisions vis-a-vis the various 
Committees, the Mayor and the administration. To remove such anomalies, some 
alternatives have been suggested over the years by the various Review Committees 
appointed to recommend reform of the City's government. It is interesting to note that no 
Committee has recommended the reduction in the size of Council as the means to achieving 
accountability. Rather, their recommendations had to do with how the Mayor is elected; 
who appoints the City's Executive Policy Committee; who chairs it; who appoints the Chairs 
of the Standing Committee; how powers are divided among the Council, Mayor and the 
Committees; how budgets are formulated; how executive power is delegated; and how 
responsibilities are divided. It is these issues which mitigates accountability rather than the 
size of City Council. For years, various provincial governments have displayed inertia in 
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addressing these issues. The current government, instead of addressing the real issues 
related to accountability, has sought refuge in the non-issue of Council size. 
Another point about accountability needs to be made. Larger wards will, undoubtedly, 
mean higher expenditures by candidates during civic elections. Such expenditures are likely 
to be twice as much as those incurred by candidates in the provincial elections. In the 
absence of party funds, candidates for Council will need to raise their own funds. 
Undoubtedly, they will seek assistance (overtly or covertly) from stakeholders. The group 
that is most likely to assist would be the land development interest which dominate 
municipal politics. In the case of pie-shaped wards, these interests will be able to buy the 
loyalties of Councillors and distort accountability, thus frustrating the very purpose of going 
for larger wards. 
4.4 MYTH #4-ASMAILER CITY COUNCIL WILLIMPROVEDECISION-MAKJNG 
It has been claimed that the present size of City Council militates against consistent 
and coherent decision making because the group is too large, and, consequently, splintered. 
Such analysis begs the question as to why over 50 MLAs are not likewise splintered, if size 
alone causes splintering? The obvious answer is that no party or larger alliance now binds 
the Councillors, and creating parties or other cohesive alliances would remedy the problem. 
However, this paper is not about the pros and cons of a party system at the local level, 
which, in all likelihood, cannot be legislated. If the objective is to minimize dissent among 
Councillors, then the solution would be to have a Council of one. 
However, the making of consistent and coherent decisions is not so much a function 
of size or dissent on Council as it is of leadership, process and structure. As in the case of 
accountability, so also are the issues of leadership, process and structure tied to the 
delineation of powers, roles and responsibilities. Here again, numerous recommendations 
have been made by Review Committees on how to improve decision-making in Council. 
These recommendations seem to have been put aside to make way for the panacea which 
the reduction in the size of Council is believed to be. 
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4.5 MYTH #5 - REDUCED CITY COUNCIL AND CONSTITUTING PIE SHAPED 
WARDS WllL REDUCE PAROCHIALISM 
The term "parochialism" has been used so often to describe the actions of Winnipeg's 
Council that many regard this as the worst pathology of City Council. In tum, parochialism 
is attributed to a large Council consisting of members who represent relatively small and 
homogeneous wards. It is alleged that such Councillors are unable to take the larger, city-
wide view. Hence, the advocacy of a smaller Council with wards of supposedly greater 
diversity. In the minds of the provincial government, achieving greater diversity would 
require the merging of inner-city and suburban wards. 
There are two questions with respect to the reduction of parochialism through pie-
shaped wards. The first is: What are some examples of parochialism that is sought to be 
eliminated? The second question is: Will pie shaped wards produce greater diversity 
associated with city-wide interests? 
With regard to the first question, the following passage is illuminating: 
There is widespread belief among members of the municipal 
elite--which seems at various times to have been reflected on 
the review committee--that municipal politics in Winnipeg is 
afflicted by parochialism, so that those who are pursuing the 
well-being of the city as a whole find themselves blocked by the 
advocates of narrow, ward-based interests. Intuitively, that 
proposition seems to make sense, but on examination it 
becomes clear that it is largely subjective. I asked each of the 
elites who complained about parochialism to give me an 
example of a decision that illustrated his or her view. For each 
of the examples I heard, an argument could easily have been 
made that it was the alleged parochialists who were in fact the 
pursuers of the city's overall welfare. For example, a number 
of people cited the cancellation of Sherbrook-McGregor 
overpass as an example of the triumph of downtown 
parochialism. If the decision had gone the other way, however, 
it could as easily have been portrayed as suburban north-end 
parochialism, saddling the city with a key link in an unwanted 
future expressway system. 
Whether we are confronted with parochialism, therefore, 
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or simply with an elite frustrated because they are not getting 
their way as easily as they would like, is a matter of opinion. 
There is no conceivable evidence that would settle the question 
conclusively. The proponents of the parochialism thesis 
generally argue in favour of at-large elections within each 
community to replace the current ward system. My opinion is 
that the wards are performing a valuable representative function 
and that any legitimate concerns about the failure of city-wide 
leadership can be more effectively addressed through the 
provisions--discussed above--for strengthening of the mayor and 
the EPC, than by abolition of the ward system. (Christoper 
Leo, Revising the City of Winnipeg Act: A Discussion Paper 
[Winnipeg: Institute of Urban Studies, 1987] 28. pp. 15-16). 
The above quotation suggests that the term parochialism, at least in the context of the 
current debate, is a synonym for interests other than those of suburban development, 
highway and bridge construction and other similar projects. It is important to be clear about 
what we mean when we advocate "city-wide" interests, particularly when we use the notion 
to shape the city's electoral system to yield such a perspective on Council. 
The second question about pie-shaped wards is answered in the next section of this 
paper. 
5.0 PIE-SHAPED WARDS: A RECIPE FOR SUBURBAN BIAS, INNER 
CITY NEGIECf AND THE MARGINALIZING OF COMMUNITIES 
OF INTEREST 
5.1 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
One way to assess whether pie-shaped wards would produce greater diversity associated 
with city-wide interests, is first to define city-wide interests, construct them to hypothetical 
pie-shaped wards, and to examine their socio-economic characteristics to judge whether city-
wide issues are likely to be of concern to Councillors elected from pie-shaped wards. 
In this section, some important city-wide interests are first identified. Next, eleven 
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socio-economic indicator of present wards and two hypothetical pie-shaped wards are 
compared, using computer generated map sets empirically to examine the effects of 
boundary changes on aggregate socio-economic characteristics of wards. From such an 
analysis, conclusions are drawn about the effect of pie-shaped wards on representation on 
the one hand, and on city-wide interests on the other. The eleven socio-economic indicators 
used in the analysis were constructed from the 1986 Census of Canada and include: 
Map Set 1- Percentage of Low-Income Households 
Map Set 2 - Percentage of Female Single Parents 
Map Set 3 - Percentage of Dwellings of Age Characteristics 
Map Set 4 - Percentage of Rented Dwellings 
Map Set 5 - Population 15 + Without Secondary Certificate 
Map Set 6 - Language Spoken 
Map Set 7 - Percentage of Aboriginal Peoples 
Map Set 8 - Percentage of Seniors 
Map Set 9 - Population 15 + without Grade 9 
Map Set 10 - Unemployment 
Map Set 11 - Immigration 
5.2 THE MAP SETS 
Each set of maps contains three or four maps. The first map in the set shows the 
distribution of the indicator in the present 29 electoral wards of the city. The second map 
shows the distribution for Community Committee areas. The third map shows the 
distribution for a hypothetical division of the city into eleven wards, three of which are 
formed by merging parts of the area in the City Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee 
with other contiguous wards to create pie-shaped wards which respect the natural divisions 
of the river system. Six other pie-shaped wards are created to the east of the three wards. 
The area to the west of the three pie-shaped wards is divided into two wards which have 
marginal characteristics of pie-shaped wards, in that they do not contain inner-city areas. 
The fourth map was constructed for only five of the eleven indicators because of problems 
in mapping marginal values. This map represents a classic example of pie-shaped wards 
which respect the natural divisions of the river system, and yet yield the magic number of 
five pie-shaped wards advocated by proponents of such wards. 
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5.3 IDENTIFYING CITY-WIDE INTERESTS 
The only documented statements on what might be considered to be city-wide interests 
are provided in Plan Winnipeg. Inadequate as these are, they do provide a starting point 
to enumerate the interests of the city as a whole. Plan Winnipeg is currently being reviewed, 
and it is reasonable to expect that the basic interests of the city will not likely change in the 
new plan. Some additional interests, consistent with the idioms and issues of the 90s, will 
probably be added to the interests in the extant plan. One of the new interests will likely 
be based on the current initiative to develop a Social Development Policy for the city. The 
other will probably centre around the current cliche of Sustainable Development. 
Without going into a long and elaborate discussion, the following items might be 
considered to be a minimum package of city-wide interests: 
the limitation of suburban development; 
the revitalization of the inner city and inner suburbs; 
addressing the shelter and services needs of all residents, particularly those who 
are most in need, such as low-income households, female single parents, seniors, 
Aboriginal peoples and new immigrants 
5.4 EFFECTS OF PIE-SHAPED WARDS ON CITY-WIDE INTERESTS 
How might Councillors elected from pie-shaped wards respond to the above interests? 
What do our Map Sets tell us? The conclusion of this study is that pie-shaped wards will 
likely bring a suburban bias, foster the neglect of the inner city and marginalize communities 
of interest. These conclusions are based on the following observations: 
(1) The maps representing 29 wards in all eleven map sets indicate substantial 
differences in the distribution of socio-economic conditions between inner -city and 
suburban areas. Most disadvantaged groups are concentrated in the inner city 
and its contiguous areas; and, in most instances, represent a significant proportion 
of voters of wards to be able to influence the outcome of elections. 
(2) As we move from 29 wards to 5 pie-shaped wards, the representation of 
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disadvantaged groups becomes marginal in terms of their ability significantly to 
influence the outcome of the election. 
(3) The maps representing the Community Committees in all eleven map sets 
indicate that the City Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee is significantly 
distinct from the other Community Committees in that its Councillors represent 
the disadvantaged groups in the city. As we move from the Community 
Committees to five pie-shaped wards, the special interests represented by the City 
Centre/Fort Rouge Community Committee disappear into the larger homogeneity 
of the pie-shaped wards. It would be reasonable to conclude that under such 
conditions, the voters representing the special interests of the inner-city would get 
lost in the overwhelming majority of suburban voters. 
It can be concluded from the above observations that pie-shaped wards would not be 
conducive to the consideration of city-wide concerns in Winnipeg. Rather, the Councillors 
elected from such wards would, as politicians, cater to the interests of their suburban 
majorities. In such a process, the current tensions in Council arising from inner-city vs. 
suburban interests will most likely be resolved in favour of suburban interests. The losers 
in the process will be the residents of the inner city -- low income households, female single 
parents, seniors, Aboriginal people, recent immigrants, occupants of poor housing and the 
receipients of poor services. However, the city will be a bigger loser in that a political 
structure will be put in place which sacrifices the larger interests of the city to the parochial 
interests of suburban development. The structure is unlikely to be sustainable, because 
sooner or later, the tensions it creates are bound to challenge its survival. 
5.5 FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
There are significant financial implications in introducing any system which alters the 
existing Community Committee structure, because service-delivery systems of civic 
departments are structured along the jurisdictional partitioning of these committees. To 
meet the objectives of accountability in service delivery, those arrangements will need to be 
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altered. There are no estimates of the financial implications of such alterations. 
Moreover, the present system of urban planning in the city is also organized on the 
basis of Community Committee areas. Consequential changes to the planning system will 
also have financial implications. The financial implications of implementing a new political 
system are often high, and rarely foreseen. Before a decision is made on pie-shaped wards, 
the financial implications should be assessed to see if the probably illusory benefits of the 
system are justified. 
6.0 ALTERNATIVES 
The alternative to revising the wards of Winnipeg is to undertake meaningful reform 
of its government along the lines proposed in the report of the 1985 Review Committee. 
Small changes in the number of wards may be possible, and indeed necessary, to strengthen 
communities of interest. The integrity of communities interest is central to local political 
boundaries. Recent reviews of Winnipeg's wards are unequivocal on this matter: 
The Committee further recommends that the boundaries and 
composition of both the Community Committees and the wards 
be adjusted where practical to provide: acceptable equality in 
population per representative, greater mutuality of interest and 
basis for cooperation among wards within Community 
Committees, and a lessening of parochial identifications dating 
from the pre-Unicity period. We suggest that new ward 
boundaries of Community Committee areas, as composed of 
mutual-interest wards, be determined on the basis of similarity 
of interest and other political criteria, rather than being 
patterned on the administratively-convenience public works 
district scheme. . . 
(City of Winnipeg Act Review Committee. Final Report, 1986. 
p. 40) 
and 
The major concern expressed at each of the public meetings 
was that the revised boundaries should address local and 
community interests on an equal basis with population density. 
The citizens of Winnipeg as well as the elected representatives, 
with one exception, were unanimous in expressing the view that 
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the 29 ward proposal be retained, and that the wards identify 
more closely with comparable socio-economic characteristics 
and historical interests of the ward residents. 
(Report of the Winnipeg Wards Boundaries Commission, 1988 
p. 8). 
7.0 CONCLUSIONS 
The following conclusions may be made from the discussion presented in this paper: 
1. That the process employed in the current review breaks from established procedure 
and raises questions about the legitimacy and creditability of the Winnipeg Wards 
Review Committee. 
2. The notion of reducing the size of City Council is rooted in turn of the century Tory 
Reform Ideology rather than in legitimate reasons. 
3. Reducing the size of Winnipeg's City Council will increase rather than decrease the 
expenses of City Council. 
4. Justifying a decrease in the size of Winnipeg's City Council on the ground of parity 
with cities such as Calgary and Edmonton is ill-advised, because Council size is a 
function of ecological structure and institutional evolution - not just the size of 
population. 
5. Decreasing the size of Winnipeg's City Council, but not those of Brandon and Portage 
La Prairie, and making representation at the local level in Winnipeg more intense than 
at the provincial level, will introduce double standards and inconsistencies in political 
representation in Manitoba. 
6. Decreasing the size of City Council will not increase accountability of Council and 
municipal administration. Nor will it improve decision-making processes. These can 
be improved only by opening up decision-making processes increasing public 
participation and reforming the internal structure of roles, relationships and decision-
making processes of Council as recommended by the Cherniak Committee. 
7. Pie-shaped wards will not foster a city-wide view in Council. Rather, they will engender 
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a suburban development bias, inner-city neglect and the marginalization of the voices 
of communities of interest with respect to their needs for shelter and services. 
8. The alternative to reducing the size of Council is to undertake meaningful reform of 
the City's government as set out in the Chemiak Report. 
9. Given the ecological structure of Winnipeg and the historical evolution of its 
government, a ward system is the best solution to political representation. Some 
marginal adjustments in ward boundaries along the lines of the proposals in the 
Cherniak Report would further strengthen representation. 
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APPENDIX A - MAP SETS 
CHARACfERISTICS OF WINNIPEG WARDS, 
COMMUNITY COMMITTEE AREAS AND 
HYPOTHETICAL PIE-SHAPED WARDS 
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I: 
SET 1 
SET2 
SET 3 
SET4 
SET 5 
SET 6 
SET7 
SET 8 
SET 9 
SET 10 
SET 11 
LISTS OF MAP SETS 
LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 
FEMALE SINGLE PARENTS 
DWELLINGS BY AGE 
RENTED DWELLINGS 
POPULATION 15+ WITHOUT SECONDARY CERTIFICATE 
LANGUAGE 
ABORIGINAL PEOPLES 
SENIORS 
POPULATION 15+ WITHOUT GRADE 9 
UNEMPLOYMENT 
IMMIGRATION 
SETl 
LOW INCOME HOUSEHOLDS 

















































